The International Community’s Modus Operandi in Postwar Bosnia and Herzegovina and in Kosovo:A Critical Assessment by Krasniqi, Gezim
  
 
 
 
Edinburgh Research Explorer 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The International Community’s Modus Operandi in Postwar
Bosnia and Herzegovina and in Kosovo
Citation for published version:
Krasniqi, G 2010, 'The International Community’s Modus Operandi in Postwar Bosnia and Herzegovina and
in Kosovo: A Critical Assessment' Südosteuropa, vol 58, pp. 520-41.
Link:
Link to publication record in Edinburgh Research Explorer
Document Version:
Publisher final version (usually the publisher pdf)
Published In:
Südosteuropa
General rights
Copyright for the publications made accessible via the Edinburgh Research Explorer is retained by the author(s)
and / or other copyright owners and it is a condition of accessing these publications that users recognise and
abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
Take down policy
The University of Edinburgh has made every reasonable effort to ensure that Edinburgh Research Explorer
content complies with UK legislation. If you believe that the public display of this file breaches copyright please
contact openaccess@ed.ac.uk providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately and
investigate your claim.
Download date: 20. Feb. 2015
Gëzim  Krasniqi
The International Community’s Modus Operandi  
in Postwar Bosnia and Herzegovina and in Kosovo:  
A Critical Assessment
Abstract. This paper analyzes the involvement of the international community in the region 
of the former Yugoslavia, focusing on the cases of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo, and 
on its attempts to foster multiethnic democracies in these war-torn societies. it argues that the 
prevailing assumption among the international community that democratic and multicultural 
institutional frameworks would automatically give rise to liberal democracy in the former 
Yugoslavia, irrespective of the establishment of rule of law, has been harmed efforts to create 
well-functioning democracies and stable societies. moreover, the paper argues that despite 
the mantra of ”multiethnicity” propagated by the international administrations in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina as well as in Kosovo, ethnic segregation has been nourished by applying the 
principle of territoriality when conferring group-differentiated rights.
Gëzim Krasniqi is pursuing a Ph.D. in sociology at the University of Edinburgh. He partici-
pates as a research assistant in the CiTsEE Project (Europeanization of Citizenship in the 
successor states of the Former Yugoslavia) based in the school of Law of that university.
Introduction
From the outset, the international missions in Bosnia and Herzegovina (here-
after Bosnia) and Kosovo engaged in a rather difficult task of introducing mul-
ticulturalism and multiethnicity in these post-conflict societies.1 Terms such as 
”coexistence”, ”united in diversity”, ”multiethnicity”, ”peace and tolerance”, 
which were keywords in the international community’s discourse on both post-
war Bosnia and Kosovo, were thought to be the recipe for healing the wounds 
of war and to help overcome interethnic divisions and cleavages. By the same 
token, the newly adopted legal infrastructures, which were largely drafted by 
and adopted under the auspices of the international diplomats and international 
1  The author would like to thank both the anonymous reviewer and Dr. sabine rutar for 
their constructive comments on the earlier versions of this paper.
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missions involved in the region, affirm the principles of multiculturalism and 
multiethnicity. The animating principle behind such undertakings by interna-
tional organizations was that of creating political entities based on the principles 
of inclusive citizenship and the affirmation of cultural diversity of the various 
ethno-cultural groups present in these two countries.
However, despite enormous efforts and financial contributions by various 
international institutions, both Bosnia and Kosovo still have a long way to go 
in order to become well-functioning democracies and societies that provide 
for equal representation in the process of political decision-making and that 
respect the human rights of all individuals irrespective of their ethnic, religious 
or social backgrounds. This peculiar development and situation represents just 
the surface of two more complex and profound normative and practical issues: 
(1) the preconditions for the introduction of liberal pluralism or multiculturalism 
in a given society, and (2) the capacities of international institutions in general, 
and European ones in particular, in formulating and implementing the proper 
policies with regard to multiculturalism. 
This paper aims to critically examine the involvement of the international 
community in the region of the former Yugoslavia, with an emphasis on the 
cases of Bosnia and Kosovo, and especially focuses on the manner in which mul-
ticulturalism has been used as a tool to rebuild war-torn and divided societies. 
The paper argues that the main reasons behind the failure of the international 
community’s effort to create multicultural and multiethnic societies in the re-
gion of the former Yugoslavia are the following: (1) its attempts to introduce 
democracy and multiculturalism prior to, or, in the best case, simultaneous 
with the establishment of rule of law; (2) its imposition of rules with little or 
no consideration of the local elites, thus turning the international community’s 
missions into something akin to ”neo-colonial”2 rule; and (3) its treatment of 
the local population not as agents of change and active members of society, but 
rather as traumatized war victims.
rather than analyzing the international presence in these territories one by 
one, this paper focuses on general developments,3 thus attempting to draw 
general conclusions from the involvement of international actors in territories 
emerging from bloody conflicts. in the first section, the paper discusses the con-
cept of liberal pluralism and the challenges of democratizing ethnically diverse 
societies. Thereafter, it focuses on the specific developments in Yugoslavia in 
the early 1990s and on the various attempts to manage and/or eliminate ethnic 
2  This term, as used in this paper, refers to a specific form of inherent political depend-
ency on, as well as control by, international political institutions of the Bosnian and Kosovar 
societies.
3  in the case of Kosovo, this paper focuses only on the developments prior to the Kosovar 
declaration of independence on 17 February 2008. 
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diversity. The third and fourth sections analyze external involvement in the 
region, with a particular focus on the successes and failures of the international 
missions in Bosnia and Kosovo.
Liberal Pluralism in Multiethnic and Multicultural Societies
in many parts of the world, the long aftermath of the second World War was 
characterized by a consolidation of the democratic state based on the liberal 
idea of individual rights. Thus, the predominant tendency of postwar liberals 
was, as inis Lothair Claude put it, 
“to subsume the problem of national minorities under the broader problem of 
ensuring basic individual rights to everyone, without reference to membership 
in ethnic groups”.4 
as a result, in many parts of the world the relationship between the state and 
its ethnic minorities was constantly neglected and the latter actually remained, 
by virtue of their number, unequal and consistently overruled under this as-
sumed principle of ethno-cultural neutrality.5 The increasing discontent of ethnic 
minorities with the classical model of democracy which, according to them, 
represents a “process of majoritarian decision-making”6 raises the normative 
and philosophical question about the limits of realizing collective claims through 
individual rights. instead, it is necessary to, in the words of James Kellas, “make 
democracy compatible with a culturally ‘plural society’”, as an “alternative to the 
classic aim of nationalism […] to form a [homogeneous] ‘nation-state’”;7 that is, 
to represent and recognize minority interests and rights from a genuinely com-
munitarian perspective. accordingly, communitarianism and multiculturalism 
are two major approaches to group-sensitive citizenship rights. 
The communitarian perspective emphasizes the limits to the realization of 
group claims through individual rights, and therefore rejects the liberal approach 
of considering cultural differences and group particularities as something ”pri-
vate”. as Vernon Van Dyke argues, in a world of heterogeneous populations in 
almost every state, it is necessary to think of ethnic and other communities as 
4  inis Lothair Claude, national minorities: an international Problem. Cambridge/mass. 
1955, 211.
5  according to Will Kymlicka, the idea of ethnocultural neutrality is a myth. Will Kymlicka, 
Western Political Theory and Ethnic relations in Eastern Europe, in: idem / magda Opalski 
(eds.), Can Liberal Pluralism Be Exported? Western Political Theory and Eastern relations 
in Eastern Europe. Oxford 2001, 13-106, 16. Cf. also michael Walzer, The Politics of Differ-
ence: statehood and Toleration in a multicultural World, Ratio Juris 10 (1997), n. 2, 165-176.
6  Will Kymlicka, multicultural Citizenship: a Liberal Theory of minority rights. Oxford 
1995, 5.
7  James G. Kellas, The Politics of nationalism and Ethnicity. London 1991, 77.
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“right-and-duty-bearing units”.8 The idea is that individuals may enjoy their 
rights best as members of such groups. Other communitarianists, such as Charles 
Taylor and michael Walzer, have also argued for the necessity of recognizing 
different group identities9 and of providing vulnerable groups “with a voice, 
a place and a politics of their own”.10 By contrast, Will Kymlicka, defending 
the ideal of liberal multiculturalism, argues for the legitimacy and necessity 
of supplementing traditional human rights with minority rights. He does so 
through a theory of justice that takes into consideration the multicultural nature 
of states and includes both universal human rights and certain group-differen-
tiated rights.11 This paper, on the other hand, is not so much concerned with the 
concept of liberal multiculturalism per se, but rather with the conditions and 
sequencing of this idea. in other words, the aim of this paper is to take a look 
at the conditions necessary for the successful application of the ideal of liberal 
multiculturalism and its institutional mechanisms. Kymlicka has emphasized 
that multiculturalism is much easier to adopt in societies or states which have 
a long tradition of rule of law and the protection of human rightsand well-
established liberal-democratic institutions.12 if this is true, does one have to go 
one step further and argue that the ideal of liberal multiculturalism might even 
be impossible to achieve in societies that have not experienced liberal democracy 
and that do not have a tradition of rule of law and human rights protections? 
The Dissolution of Yugoslavia  
and the Introduction of Ethnic Democracy
The many commentators and scholars who predicted that liberal democracy 
would seamlessly succeed communism in post-1989 southeast Europe were 
proven wrong by the developments in Yugoslavia. according to ivan Vejvoda, 
“the annus mirabilis, 1989, during which many hoped to see the stone of de-
mocracy appear underneath the rapidly crumbling stucco façade of communist 
rule, proved to be an overwhelming but short lived euphoria”.13 
  8  Vernon Van Dyke, The individual, the state, and Ethnic Communities in Political Theory, 
in: Will Kymlicka (ed.), The rights of minority Cultures. Oxford 1995, 31-56, 31.
  9  “Due recognition is not just a courtesy we owe people. it is a vital human need.” Charles 
Taylor, The Politics of recognition, in: amy Gutman (ed.), multiculturalism and “The Politics 
of recognition”. Princeton/nJ 1992, 25-74, 25.
10  Walzer, The Politics of Difference (above fn. 4), 165-176. 
11  Kymlicka, multicultural Citizenship (above fn. 5), 6.
12  idem, multicultural Odysseys: navigating the new international Politics of Diversity. 
Oxford 2007, 8.
13  ivan Vejvoda, The Exit from Totalitarianism in East Central Europe, Transition and 
Consolidation in Central and Eastern Europe 2 (1995), 37-52, 37.
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instead of an easy path towards democracy, the region embarked on a long tra-
jectory characterized by wars, political authoritarianism and, finally, transition 
to democracy. What the world witnessed in Yugoslavia in the 1990s was not a 
genuine attempt to introduce democracy (despite the liberal democratic rhetoric 
of most political leaders), but rather an attempt to create nation-states based on 
the principles of ethnicity and an exclusive, majoritarian model of democracy.
in general, the main factors that prevented these countries from introducing 
and consolidating democratic societies and states were: (1) the resurgence of 
nationalism, (2) the lack of democratic and civic traditions, and (3) the “politi-
cization of ethnicity”14 in an ethno-culturally diverse environment. Undoubt-
edly, all these factors are interconnected with one another. First, in most of the 
former Yugoslav republics, and in southeast Europe in general, new political 
elites emerged that used nationalism and identity politics to gain political le-
gitimacy and power. Thus, the emerging ethnic nationalists considered national 
majority groups (or the ”core nation”) as the “only permissible ‘state-forming’ 
entity which must predominate demographically, and its control of the state 
must be enshrined in the constitution”.15 Consequently, a sociopolitical form 
emerged that robert Hayden has described as “constitutional nationalism”,16 
which seriously impaired majority-minority relations. The entire region lacked 
democratic traditions, as republican democracy and inclusive citizenship were 
indeed largely foreign concepts. according to michael ignatieff, 
“thanks to the communist take-over of Eastern Europe, some societies – such as 
Yugoslavia – effectively passed from austro-Hungarian rule, through monarchi-
cal dictatorship in the inter-war period, to stalinist autocracy, without gaining 
any historical experience of republican democracy”.17 
This proved fatal for future developments in the region. For the elites of post-
communist Yugoslavia, democracy meant ethnic majority rule and thus republi-
can democracy and multiethnic cooperation proved incompatible.18 Democracy 
was reduced to a zero-sum game rather than a political concept that involves 
negotiations and compromises. Weak and unstable institutions and, above all, 
the lack of a strong civil society, played important roles as well. as Erika Har-
ris puts it:
14  Joseph rothschild, Ethnopolitics: a Conceptual Framework. new York 1981.
15  Janusz Bugajski, Political Parties of Eastern Europe: a Guide to Politics in the Post-
Communist Era. London, new York 2002, xxxiv-xxxv.
16  robert m. Hayden, Constitutional nationalism in the Formerly Yugoslav republics, 
slavic review 51 (1992), n. 4, 654-673.
17  michael ignatieff, republicanism, Ethnicity and nationalism, in: Catriona mcKin-
non / iain Hampsher-monk (eds.), The Demands of Citizenship. new York, London 2000, 
257-266, 258.
18  ibid., 259.
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“nationalism is the logical concomitant of transition to democracy in post-com-
munist societies, not because democracy has to go hand-in-hand with national-
ism, but because the weakness of these states and their democratic institutions 
allows nationalism to take up a position of the great unifier, mobiliser and 
legitimiser in all tasks that a newly independent democracy needs to perform.”19
quite logically, the considerable ethno-cultural diversity of the region impaired 
democratic consolidation. Ethno-cultural diversity is not a source of instability 
per se. instead, it is the politicization of ethnicity – which translates the personal 
quests of individuals for meaning and belonging into group demands for re-
spect and power20 – that becomes a source of instability and conflict. in former 
Yugoslavia, institutions that protected ethnic diversity were undermined by 
a combination of the prevalence of nationalist elites that desired homogenous 
nation-states and the lack of democratic traditions of negotiation and modera-
tion. Therefore, the ideal of constructing homogenous nation-states out of an 
ethnically diverse reality produced disastrous results, ranging from “ethnic 
unmixing”21 to “ethnic cleansing”. The process of state consolidation was, at 
best, characterized by the empowerment of the core nation and the disempow-
erment of ethnic minorities. instead of moderation in claims and in responses, 
negotiations, and cooperation, which are a conditio sine qua non for diversity 
management in a democratic society,22 ethnicity became the basis of democracy 
in former Yugoslavia.
in general, the tension between democratic consolidation and ethnic diversity 
is particularly salient in the context of transitional societies characterized by deep 
ethno-cultural diversity, where democracy has never had a strong foothold and 
the new political elite cannot rely on sound traditions of democratic reasoning 
or institution-building.23 Certainly this was the case in Yugoslavia. Because of 
the prevalence of nationalism and the ethnic principle, most of the successor 
states of Yugoslavia adopted what sammy smooha describes as a system of 
ethnic democracy, and hence a ”diminished type of democracy”, lacking a 
number of core democratic features.24 These tensions stemming from political 
19  Erika Harris, nationalism and Democratisation: Politics of slovakia and slovenia. 
aldershot et al. 2002, 8f.
20  rothschild, Ethnopolitics (above fn. 13), 6.
21  rogers Brubaker, nationalism reframed: nationhood and the national question in the 
new Europe. Cambridge 1996, 166.
22  monica robotin, a Comparative approach to minority Participation in Government, in: 
idem / Levente salat (eds.), a new Balance: Democracy and minorities in Post-Communist 
Europe. Budapest 2003, 153-169, 166.
23  Levente salat, southeast European Challenges to representative Democracy, in: ro-
botin / salat (eds.), a new Balance (above fn. 21), 3-30, 15.
24  sammy smooha, The model of Ethnic Democracy, in: idem / Priit Järve (eds.), The Fate 
of Ethnic Democracy in Post-Communist Europe. Budapest 2005, 5-59, 21f.
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disputes led to open warfare in the cases of Bosnia, Croatia and then Kosovo, 
thus triggering external intervention. 
International Involvement in Yugoslavia
in the early 1990s, after the Yugoslav crisis erupted, many international ac-
tors, such as the United nations (Un), the European Community (EC), and the 
Conference for security and Cooperation in Europe (CsCE) became directly 
involved in the events. The Yugoslav crisis evolved in a period characterized 
by the global diffusion of both a political discourse on multiculturalism and 
its codification into different international legal norms, mostly embodied in 
international declarations and conventions addressing minority rights.25 in-
deed, in this period concerns and efforts to develop minority rights standards 
and to institutionalize ethno-cultural diversity proliferated, culminating in 
the adoption of several pieces of minority rights legislation on the regional as 
well as the global levels. Certainly, some of these norms and documents were 
motivated by the conflicts in Yugoslavia. in the context of minority rights dif-
fusion, the Guidelines on the recognition of new states in Eastern Europe and 
in the soviet Union,26 adopted by the EC on 17 December 1991, were of crucial 
significance, for they introduced the principle of political conditionality. This 
concept asserts that breakaway republics would gain international recognition 
contingent upon the condition that the new entities (1) constitute themselves 
on a democratic basis and, (2) fulfill the requirement to provide guarantees 
for the rights of ethnic and national groups and minorities in accordance with 
the commitments subscribed to in the framework of the CsCE, known as the 
Charter of Paris for a new Europe.
in the first phase of its involvement in the Yugoslav conflict, through the Con-
ference on Yugoslavia from 1991 to 1992, the international community aimed at 
playing the role of a neutral arbiter in the process of the country’s dissolution. 
according to Geert-Hinrich ahrens, a senior European diplomat present in Yu-
goslavia at that time, at the beginning “the international community was slow 
to react to the Yugoslav crisis and had no agreed strategy how to deal with it”.27 
Thus, its approach was mostly reactive. With regard to ethnic minority issues, 
various international mediators in Yugoslavia aimed to achieve two objectives: 
(1) to keep minimize the size of minority groups, thus reducing the size of the 
25  Kymlicka, multicultural Odysseys (above fn. 11), 3f.
26  Guidelines on the recognition of new states in Eastern Europe and in the soviet Union, 
adopted by the Council of the European Community, 17 December 1991, reprinted in Europe 
5632 n. s., 18 December 1991.
27  Geert-Hinrich ahrens, Diplomacy on the Edge: Containment of Ethnic Conflict and the 
minorities Working Group of the Conference on Yugoslavia. Washington/D.C., Baltimore/
mD 2007, 38.
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problem,28 and (2) to protect the remaining minorities by formulating strict 
rules and by imposing the concept of multiculturalism.29 nonetheless, it was uti 
possidetis juris – a principle in international law referring to states gaining their 
sovereignty from a colonial power, and affirming the administrative borders 
that existed prior to independence – that won out over the ethnic principle in the 
process of the dissolution of socialist Yugoslavia. application of this principle 
in the case of Yugoslavia meant that the newly sovereign states’ borders should 
correspond to the former borders of the republic. The EC set strict criteria for 
minority rights as a condition for recognition. However, in many cases political 
interests prevailed instead. in other words, the international community lacked 
a blueprint and the political will to stick to the previously set standards. instead, 
it frequently ended up merely reacting to the developments on the ground and 
often applied double standards.
For example, Germany, the largest EC country, recognized Croatia on 23 
December 1991, some three weeks before the Badinter Commission30 would 
issue its report, in which it assessed, among other things, that Croatia did not 
fulfill the necessary criteria, and especially not the stipulations related to minor-
ity rights. On the other hand, although the Commission found that macedonia 
did fulfill the criteria, as a consequence of Greece’s (which accused macedonia 
of having territorial pretensions toward Greece) persistent objections, EC/EU 
member states did not extend recognition to macedonia until December 1993. 
similarly, the international mediators negotiated the possible modalities for the 
accommodation of the serb minorities in Croatia and Bosnia, while refusing to 
do the same in the case of the albanians in Kosovo and macedonia. and it was 
precisely because of its failure to negotiate acceptable solutions in Yugoslavia in 
time that the international community had to intervene militarily, first in Bosnia 
and later in Kosovo, and to impose its own political models on these territories.
The International Missions in Bosnia and Kosovo
The initial response of the international organizations, particularly the Un, 
during the violent conflicts in Bosnia and later in Kosovo, was to use diplo-
macy in an attempt to halt the war. David Chandler notes that “the Un was 
heavily criticized in the late 1990s for failing to safeguard human rights due 
28  Ethnic minorities were seen as the main problem in the conflict.
29  ahrens, Diplomacy on the Edge (above fn. 26), 90.
30  The European Communities Conference on Yugoslavia (ECCY), which convened on 7 
september 1991 under the chairmanship of Lord Peter Carrington and Cyrus Vance, included 
an arbitration Commission, which arbitrated on “differences” submitted by the conflicting 
parties.
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to its prioritization of finding a negotiated peace”.31 as a result, during the 
last phase of the war in Bosnia, and especially during the war in Kosovo, the 
conflicts were assessed from the perspective of human rights abuses, with one 
side being seen as the victim and the other as the perpetrator. Thus, for many 
scholars and human rights activists, naTO’s intervention in Kosovo “marked 
the beginning of a new age of human rights enforcement”.32 indeed, after the 
military interventions by naTO in Bosnia (1995) and Kosovo (1999), the Un 
established its largest peace-building33 missions ever. This meant that the Un 
missions for the first time would have the mandate and the power to shape the 
political sphere and society in these territories. notwithstanding the differences 
in the nature of the conflicts in Bosnia and Kosovo, the tools brought to bear by 
the international community in reconstructing these societies were essentially 
the same and involved the installment of international officials with executive 
authority over these territories, whose decisions had the force of law.34
With regard to the way the international missions in Bosnia and Kosovo were 
designed and implemented, two main concerns arise. First, these societies were 
regulated based on exogenous rules and without proper political input from 
local polities; in the words of Chandler, in these countries “the political sphere 
has been colonized by external regulation”.35 second, even after the settlement 
of the conflict the local populations were primarily seen as victims rather than 
potential agents of post-war political and social change. Both aspects proved to 
be of crucial importance when it came to determining the fate of democracy and 
liberal pluralism in these countries. instead of assisting and empowering local 
leaders to take responsibility over their political sphere, international officials 
preferred to rule over them. By the same token, instead of mobilizing the local 
populations to participate in public debates and discussions about politics and 
issues of major concern to them, the international administrators continued to 
view them mainly as war victims and as people who could not be entrusted with 
any active role in politics (apart from elections) and the public sphere. This kind 
of demobilization and depoliticization of the local population was especially 
31  David Chandler, From Kosovo to Kabul: Human rights and international intervention. 
London 2002, 174.
32  ibid., 15.
33  according to the Brahimi report (2000), peace-building includes, but is not limited to: 
reintegrating former combatants into civilian society; strengthening the rule of law; improving 
respect for human rights through the monitoring, education and investigation of past and 
existing abuses; providing technical assistance for democratic development; and promoting 
conflict resolution and reconciliation techniques. For more see the report of the Panel on United 
nations Peace Operations (a/55/305 – s/2000/809), 21 august 2000, available at <http://www.
un.org/peace/reports/peace_operations/>. all websites were last accessed on 11 January 2011. 
34  matthew Parish, Paradigms of state-Building: Comparing Bosnia and Kosovo, Journal 
of Eurasian Law 3 (2010), n. 3, 1, available at <http://ssrn.com/abstract=1680226>.
35  Chandler, From Kosovo to Kabul (above fn. 30), 203.
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prevalent in the case of Kosovo and began with naTO’s intervention. accord-
ing to slavoj Žižek, this stems from the fact that international interventions are 
justified exclusively in the depoliticized language of human rights:
“in this context, men and women are no longer political subjects, but helpless 
victims, robbed of all political identity and reduced to their naked suffering [...]. 
The ideology of victimization is the real problem: it’s perfectly fine to help the 
helpless albanians against the serbian monsters, but under no circumstances 
must they be permitted to throw off this helplessness, to get a hold on themselves 
as a sovereign and independent political subject – a subject that doesn’t need 
the kindly shelter of naTO’s ‘protectorate’. no, they have to stay victims. The 
strategy of naTO is thus perverse in the precise Freudian sense of the word: 
The other will stay protected so long as it remains the victim.”36
neither the international intervention in Bosnia nor that in Kosovo has been 
planned carefully in terms of long-term political goals. a long-term strategic 
plan was lacking, as were ideas regarding the long-term future of both ter-
ritories. according to matthew Parish, in the case of Bosnia, the intervening 
foreign powers’ short-term goal was to bring political stability to the region, 
whereas in the case of Kosovo the idea was “to bring some immediate stabil-
ity to the province while leaving the issue of Kosovo’s final status to some 
undetermined future time”.37 This lack of long-term political goals proved 
fatal for Bosnia’s and Kosovo’s prospects for democracy and the rule of law. 
in the case of the former, the international military presence and the insistence 
(in particular by the U.s. government) on organizing early elections (despite 
the fact that the elected officials would still be controlled and ruled by interna-
tional administrators) did not keep the conflicting parties from harassing and 
expelling the remaining minorities, from impeding the return of refugees and 
internally displaced persons, and from misusing the voter registration process 
to increase the ethnic homogeneity of both the polity and its government.38 Thus 
the nationalist forces that succeeded in the 1996 elections managed to cement 
the postwar ethnic division of Bosnia and Herzegovina that remains intact to 
this day. as susan Woodward argues, “Bosnia was therefore becoming less 
multiethnic after Dayton, not more”.39 This suggests that the main concern of 
the external actors in Bosnia was not security and the rule of law, but the rush 
to establish democratic and liberal institutions, which in return were utilized by 
nationalist parties to create ethnically pure local and regional entities. Thus, it 
36  slavoj Žižek, naTO, the Left Hand of God, Nettime, 29 June 1999, available at <http://
www.egs.edu/faculty/slavoj-zizek/articles/nato-the-left-hand-of-god/>.
37  Parish, Paradigms of state-Building (above fn. 33), 8.
38  susan L. Woodward, Bosnia and Herzegovina: How not to End a Civil War, in: Bar-
bara P. Walter / Jack snyder (eds.), Civil Wars, insecurity and intervention. new York 1999, 
73-115, 102.
39  ibid., 96.
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can be argued that the attempt to introduce democracy before the establishment 
of the rule of law led to the emergence of “ethnic democracy”.
The same mistakes were repeated in Kosovo. Despite the fact that Un security 
Council resolution 1244 vested all legislative and executive powers, including 
the administration of the judiciary, in the hands of the special representative 
of the secretary General (srsG), and despite naTO’s strong military presence 
(up to 50,000 soldiers) on the ground, Kosovo found itself without a government 
once the serb military and civil servants left Kosovo in June 1999. The power 
vacuum and the relative lawlessness that prevailed in Kosovo for several months 
after June 1999 enabled albanian radical groups and individuals to harass the 
Kosovo serb population and force about half of it to leave the territory. in ad-
dition to naTO’s failed attempt to provide a stable and secure environment for 
all the ethnic groups in Kosovo, UnmiK also failed to create a unified political 
structure governing the entire territory, as serbian-sponsored “parallel struc-
tures” were allowed to operate in serb-inhabited areas of Kosovo.
Without the rule of law, both democracy as such and elections as one of its 
crucial tools are reduced to formal procedures, and all too often are abused by 
political entrepreneurs connected to radical and even criminal groups. it is obvi-
ous that the international missions in Bosnia and Kosovo largely failed to enforce 
the rule of law in the aftermath of the wars. The performance of the international 
military and civilian presence in these countries often resembled that of a force 
deployed to oversee an interim ceasefire between the conflicting parties rather 
than that of an administrative and security mission. in both cases, priority was 
accorded to elections (despite the fact that the highest international representa-
tive still would have the final say), rather than to the enforcement of the rule of 
law. in the case of the international administrations in Bosnia and Kosovo the 
belief that all the lawlessness of the war and the postwar period would wither 
away once elections were organized seems to have prevailed. Certainly, this 
did not happen in either case. The missions in Bosnia and Kosovo, according 
to simon Chesterman, suffered “from the failure to assert military and policing 
authority in the early stages of the operations”.40 Consequently, in a context 
where neither international institutions nor local ones could provide security, 
fairness and justice, elections and the multicultural constitutional design were 
in many respects stripped of their initial meaning and did not produce very 
positive results. 
40  simon Chesterman, You, The People. The United nations, Transitional administration, 
and state-Building. Oxford 2004, 112-113.
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From Human Rights Protectors to “Neo-colonial” Rulers
The international interventions in Bosnia and Kosovo were initiated, in the 
first instance, in the name of human rights. However, due to the way in which 
these missions were carried out, they came to be considered as ”neo-colonial” 
presences and administrations. ignatieff, for example, considers Bosnia, Kosovo, 
and afghanistan as 
“laboratories in which a new imperium is taking shape, in which american 
military power, European money and humanitarian motive have combined to 
produce a form of imperial rule for a post-imperial age”.41 
This becomes visible especially if one analyzes the relationship between local 
and international officials. in a situation where the locals’ job was limited to 
translating, cleaning and driving while the internationals did the grand impe-
rial planning, this relationship cannot be considered other than inherently 
“colonial”.42 Obviously, such a relationship and situation is detrimental to 
democratic consolidation, which was one of the principal aims proclaimed 
for these missions. Lack of local involvement in the postwar governance and 
decision-making process, as well as the lack of accountability among the inter-
national administrators in Bosnia and Kosovo certainly did not contribute to 
the democratization of politics or culture in these societies.
adam Przeworski argues that “[t]he first decisive step toward democracy is 
the devolution of power from a group of people to a set of rules”.43 Unfortu-
nately, this did not happen in the case of the international missions in Bosnia 
and Kosovo, as the Office of the High representative (OHr) in Bosnia (expanded 
in 1997 by the ”Bonn Powers”) and the special representative of the secretary 
General (srsG) in Kosovo had the final say in all political matters, from vetoing 
laws to dismissing elected politicians. Chandler is correct to argue that in inter-
national protectorates there exists a high degree of external regulation but little 
democracy.44 Despite internal and external criticism, the OHr had its authority 
extended over several years. reflecting on the negative impact of such continu-
ous external intervention in Bosnia, as well as on the lack of transparency and 
accountability, Florian Bieber emphasizes two different negative effects of the 
OHr’s decisions: (1) the disempowerment of the voters and local elites through 
the dismissal from office of elected officials, and (2) the de-motivation of local 
41  michael ignatieff, Empire Lite. nation-building in Bosnia, Kosovo and afghanistan. 
London 2003, 20. 
42  ibid., 95.
43  Cited in ray Taras, Executive Leadership: Presidents and Governments, in: stephen 
White / Judy Batt / Paul G. Lewis (eds.), Developments in Central and East European Politics, 
vol. 3. Basingstoke u. a. 2003, 115-132, 125.
44  Chandler, From Kosovo to Kabul (above fn. 30), 203.
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officials to make any effort to negotiate compromises.45 according to Chandler, 
the externally driven democratization process in Bosnia, 
“instead of strengthening the central institutions of the new state, and facilitat-
ing compromise and negotiation, […] has removed policy-making capacity from 
both the state and the entities”.46 
Thence, the external powers, which were supposed to be temporary, have, in 
reality, made the Bosnian political system fully dependent upon them. instead 
of deriving policies from local concerns and needs, the legislative process in 
Bosnia has been driven by technical and administrative experts in Brussels and 
Washington and imposed through the international Office of the High represen-
tative.47 Undoubtedly, this did not promote the inclusion of local stakeholders 
in politics and decision-making processes.
a similar situation occurred in Kosovo regarding the competences of the 
srsG.48 When, after almost two years of complete international control over 
all aspects of Kosovar society, the new srsG michael steiner urged some de-
volution of power to local authorities, Un officials who had been working in 
the municipalities since the start of the mission found it hard to adopt the new 
approach simply because they had become accustomed to their ”neo-colonial” 
roles.49 Therefore, though various Un officials repeatedly upheld the mantra of 
“building local capacities”, they granted the locals voting rights, but no rights 
to self-rule.50 The Un mission in Kosovo took over extremely challenging tasks, 
including the duty to provide basic civil services, to reconstruct the infrastruc-
ture, to build and run a judicial system, and to collect taxes, despite the fact 
that the Un in general had no experience in these fields and very few people 
who did possess the expertise had to perform a wide array of functions.51 in 
other words, the Un assumed duties it was unable to fulfill. The international 
actors in Kosovo held sufficient power, yet they achieved little, mostly due to 
45  Florian Bieber, Post-War Bosnia: Ethnicity, inequality and Public sector Governance. 
London 2006, 145f.
46  David Chandler, Bosnia: Faking Democracy after Dayton. London 2000, 194.
47  idem, The state-building Dilemma: Good Governance or Democratic Government?, 
in: aidan Hehir / neil robinson (eds.), state-Building. Theory and Practice. London 2007, 
70-88, 81-82.
48  The case of political empowerment was more complicated in Kosovo than in Bosnia, as 
here Un resolution 1244, the legal foundation for the international presence in Kosovo, did 
not determine the territory’s political status. as ignatieff puts it, “the problem is that 1244, 
the Un resolution he [the srsG] has been sent here to enforce, is political science fiction. it 
reaffirms the sovereignty of Yugoslavia over Kosovo, and it also calls for the Kosovars to 
enjoy ‘substantial autonomy and self-government’”. ignatieff, Empire Lite (above fn. 38), 68.
49  iain King / Whit mason, Peace at any Price: How the World Failed Kosovo. London 
2006, 167.
50  ignatieff, Empire Lite (above fn. 38), 133.
51  William G. O’neill, Kosovo: an Unfinished Peace. London 2002, 38.
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their failure to understand the local context and their mission properly. Jens 
narten argues that, with regard to the development of local capacities and the 
long-term promotion of a civic culture of tolerance and democratic values in 
postwar Kosovo, 
“external statebuilders were often restricted in their project planning due to a 
lack of necessary long-term orientation, all of which contributed to the prolon-
gation of Kosovo’s dependency on external statebuilding assistance”.52 
The failure of the international administration to transform Kosovo into a 
multiethnic society subject to the rule of law, according to mason and King, 
“resulted from a misunderstanding and misappropriation of power”.53 in short, 
the results did not match the investment. 
in this way, the international missions in Bosnia and Kosovo failed to meet the 
two key challenges of transition, namely, the establishment of a public sphere 
and its democratic control by the local people.54 Both the extended external 
political control and the patronizing attitude of international officials have 
prevented the emergence of viable local institutions. in the cases of Bosnia and 
Kosovo, international state-builders saw little need either to account for their 
policies with the local population, or to set clear strategic aims and a time scale 
for their withdrawal.55 Both missions were designed in a way as to avoid any 
kind of political responsibility and accountability for the international actors.56 
The continuous extension of external control in both cases challenged the concept 
of popular sovereignty and left little room for local institutions to participate 
in policy-making. Even in those cases where international administrators did 
cooperate with local people, it was the national leaders rather than civil society 
agents or locally oriented groups who were involved. This top-down approach, 
which usually meant that the international administrators imposed their deci-
sions on the local leaders, instituted a clear hierarchy of power with the inter-
national officials at the top, the local leaders in the middle, and the people at 
the bottom. in a situation when the public sphere was limited to international 
bureaucrats and their subordinated local leaders, the people, or the “demos”, 
52  Jens narten, Dilemmas of Promoting “Local Ownership”: The Case of Postwar Kosovo, 
in: roland Paris / Timothy D. sisk (eds.), The Dilemmas of statebuilding. Confronting the 
Contradictions of Postwar Peace Operations. London 2009, 252-282, 267.
53  King / mason, Peace at any Price (above fn. 45), 24.
54  mary Kaldor / ivan Vejvoda, Democratization in East and Central European Countries, 
International Affairs 73 (1997), n. 1, 59-83, 73.
55  Chandler, Bosnia (above fn. 43), 205.
56  Chandler argues that Bosnia is the clearest case of a state built in the process of separating 
power from political responsibility. Cases such as Bosnia where international actors exercise 
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were viewed merely as “passive bystanders”. Therefore, theestablishment of a 
centralized decision-makingin Bosnia and Kosovo changed the latter into “ter-
ritories under benevolent autocracies”.57
Certainly, this kind of approach that, de facto, ignores the political organiza-
tion of a polity as the source of sovereignty is bound to relinquish the creation 
of stable foundations for the emergence of democracy. The concentration of 
decision-making power in the hands of a single person or a small group of 
people, as well as the lack of accountability, set bad examples for both Bosnia 
and Kosovo, and heavily impaired both states’ aspirations to become fully 
functional democracies. 
Providing ”Therapeutic Governance” 
instead of civic empowerment and political activism, the people in Bosnia 
and Kosovo were offered what Caroline Hughes and Vanessa Pupavac call 
“therapeutic governance”,58 implemented through training and disciplining 
programs. The basic premise of this therapeutic paradigm is that war-affected 
populations are believed to be suffering from mass trauma and are (desperately) 
in need of mass therapeutic intervention. Local actors are thus pathologized 
and blamed for all the failures in the region. Hughes and Pupovac see this criti-
cism of the local populations’ failure to assume responsibility as “typical of the 
disavowal of external regulation within a discourse of intervention mystified in 
the language of emancipation”.59 Unfortunately, this paradigm was applied to 
both Bosnia and Kosovo. according to the two scholars, the therapeutic para-
digm became a panacea even for the faulty economic policies implemented by 
the international actors:
“Yet analysis suggests that international neoliberal economic policies imposed 
in Bosnia, requiring the retreat of the state, have failed to regenerate the Bosnian 
economy to pre-war levels. Furthermore these policies have eroded the state’s 
capacity to generate income through taxation and to regulate the informal 
economy, in turn eroding its capacity to enforce the rule of law and finance 
welfare provision, thereby exacerbating social inequalities. Thus the therapeutic 
paradigm becomes a cure-all and an apology for the inability of international 
actors to realise their blueprints for these countries.”60 
in terms of the democratization process this approach carries many risks, for 
it a priori excludes the people from the public sphere and inevitably restricts 
57  Chesterman, You, The People (above fn. 39), 153.
58  Caroline Hughes / Vanessa Pupavac, Framing Post-Conflict societies: international 
Pathologisation of Cambodia and the Post-Yugoslav states, Third World Quarterly 26 (2005), 
n. 6, 873-889, 874.
59  ibid., 883.
60  ibid., 881.
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their capacities to discuss and settle issues of personal relevance. in combina-
tion with the external control mechanisms, this therapeutic approach has had 
a destructive impact on both the public and the political sphere, resulting in 
“a ‘hypertrophied public realm’ with the political arena reduced to a narrow 
one of international officialdom […] and an ‘atrophied public realm’ in the 
sense of loss of citizenship with collective political society reduced to reliance 
on personal and parochial networks”.61 
Undoubtedly, a political sphere dominated by international officials and a public 
realm that disregards local people do not provide the necessary conditions for 
a flourishing democracy. 
The “neo-colonial” attitude of many international officials combined with 
the therapeutic paradigm that construes the members of post-conflict societies 
merely as victims who need to recover psychologically and who are absolutely 
unable to govern themselves proved fatal for the future prospects of democracy 
and liberal pluralism in Bosnia and Kosovo. Particularly deserving of criticism 
are the international community’s failure to adapt its policies to address the 
reality on the ground, as well as its failure to involve local stakeholders in the 
drafting of policies. 
“From the beginning of my involvement in the Yugoslav mediation effort to 
present-day emergency seminars on Kosovo, i have been amazed by the can-
do philosophy and the nonchalance with which certain policy planners invent 
their own solution models without asking whether the antagonists will even 
be willing or able to implement them”, 
writes ahrens,62 describing the experimental attitude of many international ac-
tors. in reality, this is closely related to the case-specific provisions adopted in 
Bosnia and Kosovo, the overall lack of valid pan-European standards, and the 
lack of consistency on the part of the international organizations. 
Introducing Liberal Pluralism  
before Democracy and the Rule of Law
The international missions in Bosnia and Kosovo both have largely failed to 
secure a safe environment for all ethno-national groups and to establish the rule 
of law. For many years, the informal economy, high levels of corruption, and 
political unpredictability have hindered democratic consolidation. Despite the 
six billion dollars that were committed to Bosnia’s reconstruction after Dayton, 
no other country of this size has more levels of government, more politicians, or 
61  Chandler, From Kosovo to Kabul (above fn. 30), 207.
62  ahrens, Diplomacy on the Edge (above fn. 26), 536.
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more potential for corruption, extortion, or impasse.63 Likewise, after 1999, the 
international military presence was in many cases unable to protect the Kosovar 
serbs from attacks, and later it failed to arrest and try the perpetrators. moreover, 
many regions in Kosovo, especially in its northern section, were never placed 
under the control of UnmiK, despite its heavy military and police resources, 
thus becoming small “pockets of lawlessness”.64 Drawing conclusions from their 
own experience in Kosovo, King and mason offer the following piece of advice: 
“install democracy comprehensively but only after security and the rule of law 
are established. The first order of business for any peace-building mission must 
be to establish order.”65 
What happened in Bosnia and Kosovo, on the other hand, is the opposite; elec-
tions were organized before there was law and order. Certainly, the sequenc-
ing was wrong. The international missions in Bosnia and Kosovo should have 
focused their efforts on establishing the rule of law and provided better security 
in the aftermath of the conflict before proceeding with elections and the transfer 
of power to local institutions. 
in other words, the international community failed to establish liberal con-
stitutionalism – which implies a political arrangement based upon a body of 
fundamental laws that define basic rights, establish governmental authority, and 
identify the limits of its competences66 – and a democratic political culture. in 
such circumstances, the emergence of liberal multiculturalism, as propagated by 
various international actors, is extremely difficult, if not impossible. Kymlicka 
notes that the existence of a well-rooted tradition of liberal constitutionalism 
“was crucial” to the type of multicultural liberalism that emerged in democratic 
countries such as the U.s., Canada and some European countries.67 multicultural 
liberalism can hardly emerge contemporaneously with liberal constitutional-
ism, especially in places where a considerable degree of ethno-national mistrust 
exists and where democracy lacks deep roots. 
Therefore, given the lack of functioning institutions, a respect for basic human 
and civic rights, and the rule of law in Bosnia and Kosovo, the enforcement of 
legal provisions promoting liberal multiculturalism among these polities fol-
lowed the wrong chronological order. although Kymlicka argues that the rise 
of multiculturalism is only a wider dimension of a broad-ranging struggle to 
liberalize society and to implement the ideals of the human rights revolution 
and civil rights liberalism, what we witnessed in the case of Bosnia and Kosovo 
63  ignatieff, Empire Lite (above fn. 38), 36.
64  roland Paris, at War’s End. Building Peace after Civil Conflict. new York 2004, 1f.
65  King / mason, Peace at any Price (above fn. 45), 259.
66  nenad Dimitrijević, Ethno-nationalized states of Eastern Europe: is There a Constitu-
tional alternative?, Studies in East European Thought 54 (2002), n. 4, 245-269, 255. 
67  Kymlicka, multicultural Odysseys (above fn. 11), 254.
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is a multiculturalism that is largely declamatory and is frequently used as an 
all-encompassing term. in an environment lacking in impartial and efficient 
institutions that guarantee basic human and civil rights for all individuals, 
concepts of multiculturalism and multiethnicity are nothing but buzz words; 
as one civil society agent in Kosovo commented, 
“there is no idea how to measure the achievement of ‘multi-ethnicity’, except the 
belief that simply by repeating a meaningless phrase it will suddenly become 
meaningful”.68 
The problems concerning the definition of a multicultural and multiethnic 
society became apparent especially in post-1999 Kosovo, where the role of the 
UnmiK remained largely undefined due to the uncertainties about the future 
status of the territory.
The Primacy of Group-differentiated Rights
multicultural liberalism is defined by group rights supplementing individual 
rights. However, international actors in Bosnia and Kosovo have overempha-
sized group-differentiated collective and cultural rights, thus ”culturizing” 
group conflicts (to use Brian Barry’s term)69 and perpetuating ethnicity as the 
main identity signifier. The Dayton Peace accords on Bosnia, the Un security 
Council resolution 1244 and the Constitutional Framework for Provisional self-
Government in Kosovo exemplify such tendencies. These formal agreements, 
and particularly the Dayton accords, have been widely criticized for failing 
to build an acceptable and working relationship between group and citizen 
rights. By prioritizing group-differentiating rights, the international actors have 
encouraged the use of ethnicity both in the constitutional settings and in the 
political relations in Bosnia and Kosovo.
The Constitution of Bosnia, which is included in the Dayton agreement as 
annex 4,70 distinguishes between the ”constituent people” (meaning Bosniacs, 
serbs and Croats), ”others” and ”citizens”, thus according special group rights 
for the former groups but failing to “harmonize them with the principle of non-
discrimination among equal citizens”.71 moreover, the voting system prevents 
68  albin Kurti, is it True That an independent Kosova Will inevitably Be a mono-ethnic 
state, Unless serb Communities and Their Territories Become autonomous?, in: anna Di 
Lellio (ed.), The Case for Kosova: Passage to independence. London 2006, 145-154, 146f.
69  Brian Barry, The Limits of Cultural Politics, Review of International Studies 24 (1998), 
307-319.
70  The General Framework agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina. initialed in 
Dayton, Ohio on 21 november 1995 and signed in Paris on 14 December 1995.
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individuals from voting for members of other ethnic groups. This is the case 
for both the House of Peoples and the Presidency, which are elected directly 
by respective ethnic constituency.72 in the words of zoran Pajić, the Dayton 
agreement, with all its fundamental contradictions – declaring a unified state 
while recognizing two separate and antagonistic entities as constituent parts 
of the state; proclaiming democracy while entrenching apartheid structures 
and ethnically based parties; re-affirming individual rights while legitimizing 
ethnic majoritarianism – raises serious concerns about the political vision that 
will prevail in Bosnia.73 in this way, the Bosnian Constitution “has simply jux-
taposed principles and declarations, reaching some sort of rhetorical balance, 
but stopping short of real accommodation”.74 This complete “culturalization” of 
group relations and the inability to realize any kind of “ethno-cultural justice”75 
in Bosnia without violating the individual rights of equal citizens endanger 
the prospects of successful liberal pluralism in Bosnia. Likewise, in a situation 
where ethno-territorial divisions have been enshrined in the country’s legisla-
tion, citizenship – as a link between the individual and the state – is largely 
understood through the prism of ethnicity.76
Group-differentiated rights have taken precedence also in Kosovo from 
the beginning of the Un administration onwards. By making reference to the 
interim agreement for Peace and self-Government in Kosovo (also known as 
the rambouillet agreement), UnsC resolution 1244, which is the legal basis 
for the Un mission in Kosovo, categorizes people into members of ”national 
communities” (article i.2 of the agreement). Thus, 
“from the very beginning UnmiK tried to accomplish multi-ethnicity in an 
ethnically based manner, by naming groups – albanians, serbs, romas, Turks, 
Egyptians, Bosniacs and ashkalis as in a terra nullius”.77 
individuals were defined, first and foremost, as members of their respective 
ethnic communities. By doing so, the UnmiK “at the very start pre-empts 
72  Jakob Finci and Dervo sejdić, Bosnian citizens of Jewish and roma origin, respectively, 
were ineligible to run for elections for these institutions and filed a suit against Bosnia at the 
European Court of Human rights. in December 2009, the European Court of Human rights 
judged that the ineligibility of Finci and sejdić lacked an objective and reasonable justification 
and violated article 14, article 3, protocol 1, and article 1, protocol 12, of the European Conven-
tion on Human rights. For more see Eldar sarajlić, a Citizenship Beyond the nation-state: 
Dilemmas of the “Europeanisation” of Bosnia and Herzegovina, CiTsEE Working Paper 10. 
Edinbourgh 2009, 23.
73  zoran Pajić, Expert Opinion. Political and Civil rights of ”Others and Citizens” in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina. sarajevo 2007, 2.
74  Várady, On the Chances of Ethnocultural Justice (above fn. 65), 146.
75  ibid., 139.
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ethnicity”.78 Ethnicity and group rights were the paramount values in UnmiK’s 
ethnicized discourse in postwar Kosovo. This process, which was initiated by 
the Un administration in Kosovo by applying the territorial principle in pro-
viding group-differentiated rights, facilitated ethnic segregation through the 
creation of new municipalities based on the principle of ethnic majoritarianism. 
Carl T. Dahlman and Trent Williams have criticized this approach of territo-
rial exclusivity and enclavization through the creation of new ethnically pure 
municipalities, arguing that the process led to ethnic segregation and merely 
advanced the illiberal agenda of ethnic nationalism.79 
The approach adopted by the international actors in Bosnia and Kosovo 
reflects a contradiction, present even in normative debates, between universal-
ism and particularism, or, as alain Finkielkraut called it, “the paradox of the 
multi-cultural vision”.80 On the one hand, the postwar legislation in these two 
countries defends the universalist values of the Enlightenment by recognizing 
no exclusions, loyalties or claims based on ancestral rights; on the other hand 
it promotes group rights (of the ”national communities”) and defends their 
exclusivity and inherited characteristics. The international actors in Bosnia and 
Kosovo adopted patchwork institutional tools and essentially perpetuated exist-
ing cleavages rather than creating a dynamic system capable of establishing a 
balance between individual and group rights.81 Certainly, the international com-
munity’s strong emphasis on group rights did not produce the expected results.
Conclusion
international peace operations have grown in number and their aims and 
mandates have expanded over time. notwithstanding these changes, the estab-
lishment of sustainable security conditions for the civilian population remains 
one of the most important aims of any peace operation.82 The failure of interna-
tional actors to establish these conditions as well as multicultural democracy in 
Bosnia and Kosovo is palpable. The strategies and order of steps taken proved 
to be wrong. as discussed in this paper, the rush by the international missions 
78  Besnik Pula, Who Constitutes the state of Kosovo? Citizenship and the Community in 
ahtisaarian Kosovo, in: Forum 2015 (ed.), European identity of Kosova, international sym-
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1998, 325. 
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to adopt and (arbitrarily) implement principles of multiculturalism and liberal 
pluralism in these countries before stabilizing them and before establishing 
the rule of law and democratic institutions that would have safeguarded basic 
individual civic rights was a mistake. The immediate introduction of contem-
porary norms of liberal pluralism to a region that had never known democratic 
rule was not the wisest approach to address ethnic diversity and conflicts in 
Bosnia and Kosovo. Equally important in this context is the continued control 
over the decision-making process by the international institutions. many rules 
and regulations were imposed without proper input from the local populations. 
The attempts to reshape ethnic identities in the Balkans by way of institutional 
engineering, or even through “institutional experiments”83 did not produce 
the expected results. instead, international authorities should have endeavored 
to institutionalize the general will and to develop a social contract among the 
local population.
With regard to the process of creating rules and institutions in multiethnic 
societies, monica robotin distinguishes two major phases: in the first phase, 
proper legislation protecting individual rights and collective rights needs to be 
adopted; in the second phase, the adopted policies should be implemented.84 
Generally speaking, the international missions in Bosnia and Kosovo were 
not completely successful in either of the phases. Thus, in many cases multi-
culturalism remains fictitious and merely the expression of wishful thinking. 
The institutionalization of democracy in multicultural and ethnically divided 
countries is a highly complex task and, if it is not carried out carefully, runs the 
risk of perpetuating ethnic cleavages. 
Though there are many differences in the way that international actors 
handled the missions in Bosnia and Kosovo, the similarities prevail. Unfor-
tunately, many of the mistakes that made in the case of Bosnia were repeated 
in Kosovo.85 notably, international officials in Bosnia and Kosovo failed to 
accomplish the following tasks: involving local politicians and the people in 
negotiations and decision-making, establishing the rule of law, tacklinge social 
and economic problems, and wielding ”soft power” (civic education, free me-
dia). in both countries, ethnic cleavages and a variety of other problems persist. 
moreover, the international administrations in Bosnia and Kosovo followed the 
problematic paradigm of ”therapeutic governance”. The pathologization of the 
war-affected societies in both countries ensured political, social and psychologi-
83  Pula, Who Constitutes the state of Kosovo? (above fn. 72), 80.
84  robotin, a Comparative approach to minority Participation in Government (above 
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cal consequences that impaired their recovery and democratic consolidation. 
Certainly, the international community’s failure to guarantee security and the 
rule of law in the immediate aftermath of the conflict and to then proceed with 
a well-balanced and consistent transfer of competencies to local actors increased 
frustration both among local populations and the international missions, thus 
ultimately increasing external intrusiveness and local dependency.
To summarize, the central lessons to be drawn from the experiment with 
liberal pluralism and multiculturalism in the former Yugoslavia are that these 
ambitions can flourish only after the democratic functionality of the society and 
the rule of law have been established, and that substantial local input is necessary 
to assure sustainable, functioning institutions. Undoubtedly, the proponents 
of liberal internationalism (i. e., promoters of turbo-capitalism) mistakenly 
expected these countries to become democracies and free market economies, 
“effectively completing a transformation that took several centuries in the oldest 
European states”,86 in the course of a few years. ignatieff has rightly pointed out 
that “the failure to grasp that democracy works only when it goes hand in hand 
with the rule of law has been the costliest mistake in the Balkans”.87 Therefore, 
the prevailing assumption that a democratic and multicultural institutional 
framework automatically generates liberal democratic substance, irrespective 
of the establishment of the rule of law, should be seriously reconsidered by 
international actors in future interventions.
86  sumantra Bose, Bosnia after Dayton: nationalist Partition and international interven-
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